

MacArthur.19
September 29

absolute Rough list of "puzzles":

Given change in strategic environment, and accounts of MAD planning,

1. Why did plans sound so familiar, and concepts?

—Because planning had never changed.

2. But why?

3. Why weapons of this type? FS, CF, etc.

—not only did technology permit this; but they were suited to plans.

But this meant heading into a new world, never existed before; the world of preemptive instability. LIKE WWI. The world feared when we worked on these plans, and the missile gap. At that time, no possibility seen of arms control; now it is. So,

4. But since this headed toward instability, why was no effort to head this off by arms control? The answer that technology or inertia of thinking was dominant did not seem adequate, given the costs and the risks.

5. Some now said that at this level of armaments the risks weren't really great—were they right: was this reliable? What was happening to the risk of war? (Public thought high and steady; experts thought low and steady. I wasn't confident that either were right in their inference that the arms race affected only costs, not the danger of war. (DY: public thinks ...experts think...)
pondered?

—Meanwhile, I was pursuing a trail of evidence, at first virtually alone, that began to point to new answers to these questions...

—In 1981 I summarized, for the first time in print, the evidence then available....

Since most of the instances remain unfamiliar, even to well-

informed analysts, I include it here.

...

[later, under Project:

—References to the open sources then available are in Call to Mutiny, with some extended quotations. Since then, investigations stimulated by this paper have turned up many more documentary sources, and others have been declassified: e.g., For Rel volumes on Korea...In 1985 Nixon caused a flurry by confirming his consideration of nuclear threats—omitted from his memoirs, and those of Henry Kissinger—the first time a President had done so since Eisenhower's (little noted) reference in his memoirs. He added some to this list. Just this month, an article in Armed Forces Journal led to investigations by NYT reporter ...who added yet another, recent and previously unknown episode of Presidential involvement in secret nuclear crises, in August, 1980 (in standard fashion, Carter's brief reference to this in his memoirs makes no mention of the nuclear dimension).

One question for investigation in this study: How many others are there? What more can be learned, by FOIA or interviews, of their details, for comparative analysis? (My particular research specialty, as on the Pentagon Papers or my previous crisis study, where I took advantage of several series of previous studies—for which I was granted special access, and clearances higher than Top Secret—). But already enough is known to permit some comparison and test some preliminary hypotheses.]

✓ —A striking aspect of this list is the number of occasions in which nuclear weapons were used for threatening in the Third World: and —except for the Cuban Crisis—all against non-Soviet, non-nuclear opponents, in a conflict that showed no possibility of "going nuclear" except by US initiative.

This dramatically contradicted the public's impression...DY. But if experts knew better, it was because they knew of the NATO commitment. (The FU/NFU controversy has focussed almost exclusively on Europe and NATO. Likewise, the earlier neutron warhead controversy—even though I had known from its "birth" that its "father" had had TW conflicts like Korea in mind. The experts were no more aware than the public that nuclear weapons had so often been even considered in the TW.

Moreover, the public, like the Catholic bishops, think that

✓ nuclear weapons should not be used—even in Europe. They might be more tolerant than the bishops of threatening their use, if the threats were carefully-controlled bluffs, with no likelihood of being carried out if they failed (as in 1969 under Nixon). But is that the case? How close is close? How to measure this? (See controversy over Armed Forces Journal: quotes.

7
✓ —See implications for democracy (secrecy, ignorance). mid 1958
C-II, above

Values—vital interest" (ASJ) applies to all these cases; what of Third World: what in these conflicts justified a risk of using nuclear weapons; what, a risk of all-out nuclear war? (See JFK in Cuba.) How did leaders see this...e.g., as they entered conflicts?

(It turns out that many presidents have had occasion to address that question...and we don't know any of their answers, starting with JFK's...see RFK...It is time we asked the right questions and demanded answers; but ultimately it is for us, citizens in a democracy to answer RFK's question. That is our responsibility and our opportunity.)

obs. ✓ Another risk: might these have led to all-out war? There, notice that all TW opponents were SU allies... Problem, of deterring a Soviet response. Note Ike; and JFK.

Implications of this for strategic arms programs. Hyp:... This has startling power. It can predict: FS character; tolerance of instability; limits of arms control proposals. Addition to factors (and single one of explanations that explains all of these) (when added to hyp. that NATO defense also leads in this direction; TW incentives—justify risk of nuc war

How to substitute for Superiority? Note mentions of madness, risk of losing control: What if this were seen as a substitute-making it dangerous for Soviets to retaliate? Could a limited amount of instability—not only hypothetical but "real" be tolerated deliberately, allowed to emerge and remain? Hyp...

✓ —Implications for risk of war: that current trends are more dangerous (when considering instability in light of possible first use) than often seen; thus that arms control is more urgent, yet requires almost entirely new proposals than those addressed by Admin. That prolif is more dangerous, if others simply imitate US practice. That requirements for triggering all-out conflict may actually be met, not only by accident but, in certain crises, by deliberate Presidential decision. That chances for accident and

mistake may be greater—and kept greater for policy reasons—than is imagined.

—Issues of public morality: One reason public is wrong about threats is assumption that FU and even threats would be wholly illegitimate in TW conflicts, given stakes (note secrecy about threats). But does government officials have bad conscience about this? And if they did—might they carry out threats any way? Could they get their orders obeyed? When might they take risks of...moral and political catastrophe?

(I was already led to study of strategic bombing, VN: led to awareness that officials had a different code since WWII; expressed in tolerance of allied terrorism and use of it ourselves, but above all in bombing plans, threats, and practice. Just Terrorism.)

(first course)

Proper Authority

No war the way (proportionate)

PROJECT:

To explore implications of US official readiness to threaten to initiate tactical nuclear war outside Europe (as well as in Europe) for: 1) strategic arms programs and posture; –and for Soviet programs, (response to US, and response to similar motives)

2) arms control policy;

← 3 the risk of actual US use of nuclear weapons in the TW

4) risk of all-out nuclear war

✓ 5) moral and psychological universe of national security managers, including the President

6) the scope, interests and values, and risks of US foreign policy towards the TW.

Second, from any reinterpretation that emerges of past and current policy and its past and future risks, to examine alternative policies that would reduce these risks and better meet American needs, perhaps differently defined, and to consider reformulated policies in the areas of arms programs, arms control, US relations with the Third World and Europe, and democratic control of foreign and military policy.

Questions:

1. What is knowable about these instances? I will gather material, collect documents from other researchers and government, possibly make FOIA requests and conduct some interviews, or encourage others to do so. Make comparative study. Utilize notes and inferences from my crisis study; and my own past work on bargaining and threat theory, brought up to date (with some review of recent literature).

–What is evidence of influence of these on Soviets? What evidence of similar motives, perhaps respecting East Europe? (Early phase of this; possible discussion with Soviets; reading).

2. What are the requirements for strategic programs of enhancing the credibility of FU threats?

My own expertise. Statements of Reagan officials, little noted (except by Paine, etc.)

Rather, how might strategic programs be related to the motive

of enhancing...

3. How do the hypothesis of such a criterion relate to other explanations of the arms race? What weight should be given it?
4. Likewise, arms control.
5. How might some degree of instability—preemptive incentives on both sides—contribute to a strategy of threatening first use or escalation? How does this relate to other explanations of the emergence of such instability, including explanations of arms control policies that allow it to emerge?

1980-
(su obs...)
6. What evidence is there that recent officials under Carter and Reagan have seen a continued, or enhanced, need for US interventions in the TW, and for FU threats? (There is a lot; see Paine, and others). What factors have contributed to this concern?
ME

7. What are the interests that condition these perceptions? how widely are they perceived; how valid the concerns; Are there alternative means of meeting the perceived needs, or lessening risks, or alternative definitions of American commitments or vital needs, that deserve public discussion? (Most speculative)

8. On risks of actual FU: What is the place, if any, of Just War constraints in the moral universe of Do they have a coherent alternative to it? Might their values lead to actual use?

.....Milgram, Kelman.....and role of ethic of obedience...

Evidence from governmental massacres of past: under Stalin, Hitler, strategic bombing by German, Japan, UK and US; terror programs.....

9. Psychology and morality of risk-taking. K and T. etc. LBJ. JFK and Cuba II. Evidence on possibility of getting out of control; deliberate acceptance of this by leaders on both sides, though with some ignorance. Like WWI; see RFK quote at end. (related to LOW, delegation, preemption...)

And see Sorensen quote at end. (Quote this at end.

?

10. Significance

—new understanding; new data, new hypotheses; new relationships/ implications of coherence, new framework in which to place real evidence of random, uncontrolled behavior, other factors.

20 01 /

—new sense of danger in current programs

—new sense of time-urgency and high priority with respect to averting certain programs by unilateral means or arms control.

—new criteria for arms control'; whole new negotiating approach for both sides. (presented to Soviets) (already reflected in their attitude to CTB and SDI—not yet to offensive weapons).

—new subjects for—and urgency of—public debate and democratic control: need for new understanding by public, new involvement—questions of values involved—and new directions in foreign relations (perhaps, in identity as Americans in the world). Interests currently influential need to be identified and challenged.

13 008 —Questions of value: relations with Third World, relations with the future, with humanity. Basic to democracy, and to national identity. Sorensen question: we deserved and needed to know JFK's answer to that question, and that of his successors, but ultimately it is not for Presidents to answer that question. It is for us. And it is not even for us alone to answer it. This project focusses, in part on the question, and

There is a deeper question: when do people of one nation have the right...? That is not to be answered by the women and men of that nation alone. But we must make a start at confronting the question. This project is part of the contribution I intend to make.

MacArthur.24
Follow-up, Thursday, Oct. 2

(First working day after getting in MacArthur Proposal, at 11:46 PM, September 30, Tuesday)

NOW WRITE:

1: What I Believe:

—Answers to the questions

—Full statements of my hypotheses

2. Why I believe it; how I came to guess it, or believe it; or, to arrive at hypotheses.

3. Who disbelieves it; and why I think they do, and why they're wrong.

(2) and (3) are lower priority; I got hung up on this during drafting. (3), partly for fear that these individuals (York?) or ones like them would be on my committee. (MBG warned me).

(Actually, she warned me not to criticize their views too overtly or polemically). (If McGeorge were on my committee, as he was on Jerry Sanders' SSRC committee, he might veto my proposal because of mention of Peddlers of Crisis. But then, he would oppose nearly everything I say! If one person represents all the views I oppose among "good guys," it's McGeorge: unless, Rathjens (who might well be on committee!)

4. What I Feared to Say:

—Certain hypotheses—esp. Construction of Instability—that seemed:

Too abstract

Too arms controlsy (both of these, for Ruth Adams)

Implausible; "conspiratorial"

Unfamiliar

Too all-of-above to be plausible in a brief account, without spelling out the argument or presenting evidence at length.

—Criticism of SAPS ("Stability is Absolute and Permanent" School: see (3).

—Accusations of our leadership, and my old colleagues. Pat: "I've always felt that you can't write because you can't bring yourself to say that these guys are murderers." (Or, culpably reckless fools: as Halberstam suggested).

Talk — They're my old bosses and friends; I chose them, was one of them, believed in them. (Do I secretly long for their continued respect? Even though association is denied me; and even though I now see what they—and we, I—did? For one thing, I don't blame them as much as I used to, or as some do; see today's file on Repression.

(Masson ignores this in his Assault on Freud). Also, I see their Good, or at least Other, distracting intentions (not all bad, or at least malevolent). (Again, contrast Masson on Freud: F's his motives to protect his image of his father and his relation with him; and his friendship with Fliess; as opposed to his careerist incentives. And see Hersh's attack on Kissinger, which ignores various strategic motives, in addition to his toadying to Nixon.) (Masson is, oddly, "unpsychological." Hersh is, oddly, "unstrategic." In interpretations of their nemeses. Why are they so bitter: e.g., Hersh? See Powers' review of KAL-007.)

Of course (!) this is related to my reluctance to recognize, or accuse, Dad of being a murderer, or a reckless fool (or at least, the instrument of my wrecking, my disaster, my abandonment: as well as my "liberator"—in Monkey's Paw fashion—which was all I permitted myself to think. Hence, a kind of nameless, inchoate horror at their behavior (or a carping bitterness)), rather than a precise definition/recognition, which would suggest too strongly what I thought of Dad's action.

(When I asked Dad just once of his feelings after the Accident (sic), he said he was mainly worried that I would never forgive him. But actually, I never consciously considered that there was anything to forgive. (!)

-My Conspiracy Theory. What I think they're up to. Actually, this is an area not wholly resolved in my mind. Increasingly, I suspect that the role of conscious motives has varied from Administration to Administration; and even, the real (including unconscious) impact of a desire for First-use Threats (as distinct from other motives), esp. in the TW (Third World).

*to be demonstrated?
after Iran: a New Era?
(Rome)*

Thus, I think latter motive became especially strong, and a strong factor in the arms race, after Vietnam, the fall of the Shah, along with other independence movements—Angola, Nicaragua, etc.—the changed role of the US in the world economy—greater reliance on trade at the same time as greater competition—perhaps the new financial arrangements after 1971-73—the need for an RDF especially for the Middle East (ME) after failure of VN strategy and of proxy strategy (Iran)... (Aug 80's! Saudis!)

Much earlier (late 40s and 50s) FU/FS in NATO was a major incentive, for diplomatic and financial reasons of relations with West Europe (including holding down CPs). Also, selling weapons, to keep the aerospace industry profitable (see USAF Postwar Planning). And, bolstering CW, for various reasons.

In 60s, there continued to be a planning incentive to "fight a war, if one comes, in the best way: to limit damage, end war, perhaps "prevail" or win: latter, with additional incentive of deterrence." (This was not, in late 50s-early 60s integrated with arms control policy, which was hardly considered. But even in late 60s and later, it doesn't seem to have been integrated—treated together—with arms control policy: either from compartmentation and inertia, or because this was really a cover for other aims, FU credibility/superiority, which couldn't be achieved by arms control).

But throughout the period, there was a need to support FU threats: e.g., Berlin 1948 (if not Iran 1946), and Korea 1950.

And planning shows (Herken) that the Middle East oilfields were put on a coordinate basis, secretly, with NATO from the beginning: just like the Carter/Reagan Doctrine which made this overt.

*to understand our role,
shape/nature
scale*

This was even rationalized, as in case of Carter/Reagan doctrine (and crisis of August 1980) as being necessary to NATO: if Su controls ME oil, then NATO goes (or at least, US control of NATO goes! West Europe makes separate deals with SU!—as now, over gas! Finlandization! At that time, late '40's, the concern

was for oil for the Navy: UK and US. See the British concern for their naval supplies—and their hard currency sales—in 1953, when Mossadegh nationalized Iranian oil.

(86!) At that time, Europe didn't depend on oil for energy; it used its own coal. But Marshall Plan changed that; it made Europe dependent on oil (shutting down coal mines!), sold to them by US firms, shipping ME oil. Since then, "the health of Western Europe"—i.e., Western capitalism—i.e., US domination of Western European economies—has depended on "access to" (via US firms) Middle East oil.

✓ See Noam Chomsky's theory that the HAK/US nightmare all along has been that Europe and Japan would make independent deals—presumably with new regimes in the ME, not under our control—for energy, becoming independent of our firms and policy, our "oil weapon", just as might happen if Europe turned to Soviets for gas and oil.

? Is this, now, all fantasy? Quite apart from SU's need for energy, would they turn down this lever of control, which has served US so well? If SU alert was just an exercise—as Komer says—why was it? Or do the Soviets assume, correctly, that any US Administration, even Jimmy Carter's, would go to nuclear war to protect Iran and Middle East oil, whatever the public expected or wanted? So that the Soviets don't really consider this at all; any more than they think about invading West Europe. (Which, however, they do practice!)

? Have they ever done the same for the Middle East, i.e., practice an invasion in maneuvers? Presumably their often-practiced invasion of West Germany is their (threatened, and planned) answer to invasion of East Europe/Germany by Germany; whereas they don't expect any invasion from the Middle East. But why isn't the latter part of their rehearsed response to intrusion by NATO forces? Or is it?

This would be the real "horizontal escalation." Judging from the studies reported by Armed Forces Journal, this would be a jugular genuinely unguarded—except by nuclear weapons—just like Berlin, but far more important. Is that what SAC, the NATO buildup, and the first-use apparatus and policy have always been mainly for: to deter or respond to an attempt by the Soviets to takeover the Middle East oilfields, or to intervene against a US 1980 *Assessment* intervention against "radical" revolutionary movements in the

Middle East?

See two previously -secret nuclear crises both revealed by Nixon in July, 1985: both designed, in 1956 and in 1973, to prevent the Soviets from intervening unilaterally in Egypt—as they explicitly threatened to do if we refused to join them in their proposed joint peacekeeping force—to "separate the warring forces," i.e., to halt an offensive by our allied "enforcers" in the Middle East, earlier the British, French and Israelis, in 1973 the Israelis alone, both against the Egyptians.

What were we afraid of? (Note all the similarities, which I will not analyze here. Look this up in: Miles Copeland; Rope of Sand; Chomsky; Hoopes on Dulles (see my crisis study of Suez, which I participated in); etc.) Presumably, a direct, "legitimate" role for Soviet Union in Egypt and Middle East; "with us," "equal to us". Why so bad? Wouldn't it limit our ability to intervene unilaterally in future events in the Middle East: to prevent the coming to power of independent regimes which might not be under the influence of the Soviets (or might) but which might deal independently with Western Europe and Japan?

126! And see the financial implications of the control of ME oil. (Peter Dale Scott) PDS says: It is our protector relation to the current (unpopular, corrupt, autocratic: not fundamentalist)) regimes that led to their deciding to demand payment for oil in dollars, a crucial policy that Wachtel doesn't explain at all, though he describes it as the fundamental basis of the new world monetary arrangement, which saved our ass, not only in the oil crisis but—for years—from pressure of world trade competition.

How does Israel fit into this? Probably in a complicated way: as the ultimate protector of US interests, a base and active intervenor, guarding against the emergence of "radical regimes." In this latter case, it functions in the interests of the current Arab regimes as well, which can meanwhile pose as nationalist (despite their relation to the US!) by their anti-Israeli stance (like Mexico, in its pro-Cuba/anti-US foreign policy stance; or various countries in their anti-Communism, which would be endangered by genuine peace with Israel! (Presumably Israel, which likewise requires an "Arab threat," but would clearly prefer the current regimes to radical successors, banks on this, lives with it, encourages it).

Note PDS' inhibitions about writing directly about his

overall "conspiracy" hypotheses. My inhibitions show up in not writing at all, or not on this aspect. His show up in style: pointillist accretion of "linkages," footnotes, evidence, without a clearly stated thesis. Both of us are wary both of radical image and of criticism from scholars. He has to worry about academic standing; I don't have any, but act as if I did, and had to protect it.

—Criticism of my Left friends, on nuclear issue. (Chomsky, Klare, EPT. Essentially, emphasizing so much the issue of intervention and foreign policy and interests as to downplay the coordinate, associated problems of the arms race, first-use threats and the real danger of nuclear war (Chomsky does, now, emphasize latter: but not the way in which the new arms race, with its destabilizing weapons, strengthens the coupling of FU threats and FU in the TW to the possibility of escalation).

EPT follows Zuckerman—and York—in a kind of technological determinism (like Marx! Whom EPT paraphrases directly, come to think of it: "If the handmill produces...and the steam engine produces...what do these weapons produce? Exterminism!" But this is wrong, now; and was probable wrong for Marx's syllogism! But they do condition social and leadership choices.) Also, they overemphasize the domestic political power of the weapons labs (as does de Witt? Understandably. Still, on Star Wars, the role of Teller and Wood seems quite specific...).

Of course, Leftists other than EPT seem to have neglected the nuclear issue in the past entirely—see SR (and my leaving them) and NLR (and EPT's leaving them)—on grounds that it was mere neutral technology, depending on who used it (see CP's position in Japan: only "imperialist" Bombs were bad). All this seems changed now (Japan?).

—The role of MNCs in US foreign and military policy; the requirements of Empire, postwar style—now, 1980s style. (Is shift to open US intervention, RDF backed up by FU threats and FS buildup, with Rambo unilateralist, vigilante ideology (anti-World Court, ignoring allies, flaunting even domestic legislation (TRW) *center!* *Reason!* *on defense*) against involvement or against use of US to plan or carry out hostile acts) comparable in motivation to the "imperialist scramble" of the late 19th century, when emphasis on "free trade" (the "empire of free trade"—multilateralism) gave way to naked colonial adventures and direct rule? Then the pressure was from rising competition from Germany and France. Now, similarly: plus rising rebellion in the former colonies themselves. (Plus—or

not?—an increasingly active role by the SU?

Am I the counterpart to a Little Englander? (check that out)

Certainly, I am an anti-imperialist. See the Anti-Imperialist League in Mass. with respect to the Phillipines (!): e.g., F...)

—Note the role, in the lead-in to WWI of imperial rivalries and imperial pressure on TW countries, "crises"—along with the role of technology, and the pressures of independence movements. I might have mentioned this in my analogy with WWI!

—In lectures, I always shy away from telling, in the lecture, "This is what I think it's all about" (see above, conspiracy). Too speculative; too unfamiliar; too radical. I say it only if asked in question period: even when I have vowed to myself to go into it beforehand, in the lecture.

4. What I Thought of Saying, but discarded, for space:

Colorful personal history angles, as lead-in:

600 million dead, in SIOP

Quemoy, Berlin, Cuba II as background on FU threats

How I learned about Nixon's FU threats (Haldemand, Ahmad, Morris; Hersh).

Nixon's actions towards me, because of his fear that I knew of his FU threats (Hersh). Compare Nixon's "That Ellsberg thing was stupid...I don't know why I did it" (Newsweek, 1985. He's probably forgotten! Or else he's still protecting his nuclear threats: yet, that same month, he was revealing the latter in Time, for the first time! Perhaps he was concealing—even from himself?—the lengths he had gone to to keep these secret at the time.

(How much does Jimmy Carter admit to himself that he engaged in consideration of FU in the ME, in August of 1980? See Brown's denials; and Carter's silence in his memoirs. This was just shortly before his final speech on the nuclear menace. It was soon before his debate in which he quoted Amy against the risk

of nuclear war (see memoirs). Soon after failed hostage raid. Just around time of convention, in which, like LBJ in 1964, he faced an opponent believed to be prone to military action, shooting from the hip, toughness, and friendship to nuclear weapons. Would he have wanted it known that he—like LBJ himself in 1964! (Seabrook: see Henry Cabot Lodge and Canadian to LBJ, August 1964)—had been involved in discussions of using nuclear weapons?!

My past "crimes" (see file on repression: as examples of my forgetting).

Quotes from RFK, end of memoir, on Bethmann on WWI; and Sorensen on whether any one has a right to risk future generations (RFK's raising this—posthumously—is like "retirement syndrome" affecting Rickover, McNamara, etc.

—Cuba II. See my WGBH transcript.

MacArthur.25

October 3, 1986

Significance:

-Change public awareness of:

✓ 1) actual policy✓ 2) actual past practice, hidden history, near misses: and for what?✓ 3) current preparations: RDF

4) Bearing of actual policy and practice on "secular" FU/NFU controversy (Gang of 4, Atlantic)

see news 4 (Schultz, Perry, NAR - all involved in FU threats!)

5) Bearing on moral FU/NFU controversy: Bishops

*like Perry of 4 (NFU!):**McN, McG B (not, Korman on Smith?)*6) Bearing on "deterrence" controversy: Methodists, Bishops, Ethicists: in light of real varieties of deterrence, main aspects of deterrence (Type II), real risks it has exposed us to, real attitudes of leaders it is based on; the temptations that even preparation for Type I gives rise to; the

7) the urgency of stopping the advent of destabilizing weapons; hence the relative advantages of arms control proposals that do this—Freeze, CTB, anti-MIRV, etc.—vs ones that don't: Build-down, "reductions," START, SALT, TTB...

8) discover true nature of US relationships with the poor countries of the world; reasons for intervention; contribution to revolutionary aspirations and struggle; nature of regimes we ally ourselves with; reasons we "need" an RDF, including reasons for the lack of "allies" in various regions, and reasons we have trouble getting bases for the RDF; real need to discover alternative foreign policies...

9) See arms race as a "cost" of our FU policy, our current intervention policy, our current and past foreign policy toward the TW.; likewise, see the risk of nuclear war as increasing for this reason, and being as high as it is—including the prospects for proliferation (which is, in the light of this history, even riskier than it may have appeared: leaders do not have to more mad than past US presidents to be dangerous to international security—because of these policies. Hence...

—Reorient "elite" discussions: of FU/NFU;
of moral aspects of FU and of Type I Deterrence;
; of all above.

—Need to understand the moral universe of decision-makers; where it differs from that of the public, confront that fact, change decision-makers, or their values, or modify one's own.... But with respect to last possibility: note that the decisionmakers' current framework—which preceded nuclear weapons—led causally to the current arms race and current policies and the current risk of war: reasons to question it, despite its elite adherents, their reasons for affirming it, its "modernized" aspects as an ethical approach.

—Both public and elites need to reexamine:

—their attitudes toward the threat of nuclear weapons, or of intervention, as distinct from actual execution; if it is more positive than toward execution, they should reconsider the degree to which threats lead to preparations for execution and to the rejection of alternatives, in the interests of credibility; and how this actually does increase the risks of war: in some circumstances, and perhaps overall.

(Thus, given threats, and commitment

Basic conception: That US nuclear weapons are not exclusively, to even primarily, to deter Soviet first-use as to deter Soviet second-use, i.e., to deter Soviet retaliation to US first use. Obviously, that would hardly be possible if US first-use were directed against Soviet forces or cities in the Soviet Union, East Europe or probably, in West Europe.

And against an opponent that had no relation at all to the

8-25-7

if "cred" forces to convince or to deter:
a skeptical, incredulous (from?!)
S(H?)
reckless, committed, or
"mad" adversary, or
(or with "crazy" strategies?
SU vs. NATO in 1950's
like Bush/Bag/Am
worst situation: USG
commits a des. crazy strategy
— not advising civ'l behavior
(like Congress!) he could
do it! (S+WB-Helf)

OR
PREEMPT
(on
FS, D-2
forums)

Soviet Union, Soviet retaliation to US first use would almost surely not arise as an issue, a possibility, a threat. (China would pose special considerations: an adversary of the Soviet Union, yet a Communist nation and a neighbor, a rival for leadership of the "socialist" bloc...)

The real concern is to keep the Soviet Union from extending, in threats and promises, a "nuclear umbrella" against US intervention or US first-use, over allies or client states of the Soviet Union. This is achievable, by threat of US escalation or preemption. Thus, the US may deter Soviet second-use in the Third World by threatening either to expand the nuclear conflict or to prevent a Soviet first-strike and prevent or limit a Soviet second-strike, by US preemption.

2.3. Long
NVN
Cuba (deficit R threat)
Egypt 56 4 u u

The aim of US first-strike strategic forces is to "free" US first-use by detering Soviet second-use in the Third World. (!)

SAC is meant to make the Third World safe for US first-use, by detering Soviet second-use.

To reduce the risk of nuclear war, both limited and all-out, it is more important than has been generally realized to change US foreign and military policy toward the Third World. This means redefining US "vital interests" in the Third World, and also plans and strategies for safeguarding those interests that are still regarded, after reexamination, as important. Either eliminating or minimizing the risk of nuclear war arising from a Third World conflict would almost surely required abandoning a policy that made use of threats of US first use in the Third World (or elsewhere! Since threats elsewhere, and preparations to implement those threats—e.g. in NATO—would almost surely be extended to cover "real" critical challenges in the Third World, especially in the pressure of a crisis). It would also be necessary to cut the link between Soviet retaliation to US first-use and threats and preparations for US escalation or preemption.

+ Arab (T; and regional
 are wars)

(from earlier draft, McArthur.17):

To reduce the risk of nuclear war, either limited or all-out, it is more important than most have realized to reexamine, reevaluate, and modify —perhaps first bringing under more democratic control—US interrelationships and mutual dependence with Third World regimes, resources and people, US foreign and

interventionary policies, US first-use policy in the Third World as well as Europe, and the linkages between all of these and US strategic nuclear forces and weapons programs.

Underlying this is the conclusion that risks of all-out thermonuclear war are implicit—via US first-use policy—in every — *no. 50 short* major US intervention, and thus—via US intervention policy (largely secret from the public, both in its covert aspects and in its planned readiness for overt engagement) are implicit in overall US foreign policy towards the Third World.

This is a new, late-Twentieth Century reason for questioning and modifying age-old imperial relationships between "core" nations of advanced technology and industry and "peripheral" nations of less advanced military capability. Efforts to expand or maintain imperial controls over weaker nations, in rivalry with other nations highly developed in destructive power, now have the potential of ending most "advanced" life in the Northern Hemisphere or even (given the dependence of the poorer Southern Hemisphere on the North for food, fertilizer, energy and technology) on the globe.

It is not only US relations with the Third World that need changing—to reduce the perceived "need" for US interventions and FU threats—but US relations with the Soviet Union, which have the potential both for stimulating armed Third World conflicts and US/Third World conflicts and for turning them into nuclear crises and wars. Thus, detente appears more important—so far as it reduces the likelihood of a Third World conflict being perceived as threatening US vital interests and calling for a US commitment or intervention or FU threat.

Likewise, the arms race itself appears more threatening in this light, in interfering with detente and general peacemaking and coordination with the Soviet Union. Moreover, the arms race, in its budgetary pressure, encourages a US Administration demonize the Soviet Union and to interpret Soviet moves in the most threatening light (KAL-007, Soviet weapons programs, Afghanistan, Soviet involvement in Central America, support of terrorism) so as to mobilize support for the expenditures of the arms race. This in turn causes new incidents to be seen as "crises," calling for a US military response, and prevents negotiations, agreements or collaborative action to solve existing disagreements or avert sources of conflict.

8-25-7

imperial (little England)
1840-70, 1901 (Box War)

—imperial empire,

reference—

NON-INTERVENTIONIST

(see UN Charter, 1945)

(colonial crisis:

France/VN)

(Covert? leads to
intervention: right
+ need for it, if
covert means of
domination fail.

(But see notes:
to oppose "free trade,
overseas, multilateralism
("essential" to US:
Arabian...)

Relieved of the requirement to bolster credibility of US first-use threats, US planners (led by the public!) could reexamine "on their own merits" preparations for "(second-strike) insurance," damage-limiting systems and tactics designed to reduce damage "if a war occurs." This possible contribution would probably, in almost every case, appear outweighed by the effect of such a capability in raising Soviet fears of US preemption in a crisis, thus stimulating Soviet countermeasures and possible LOW or preemption in a crisis.

*Dead Hand
and SU countermeasures
in crisis*

If the latter effects were seen as wholly negative—in the absence of reliance on the threat of US preemption, as a deterrent to SU second-use or escalation—they would indicate the desirability of abandoning such "insurance," as increasing risks greater than those they protected against. That is, it would be desirable to abandon preparations for: preemption, decapitation, launch-on-warning (whose speed of response is necessary only to achieve damage-limiting aims: which depend on having capabilities for prompt counterforce which pose a threat of preemption, and for that reason are to be abandoned) (An automated "launch-after-attack" system would not pose this danger).

This rejection of damage-limiting would simply apply to offensive systems the rejection of ABM systems accepted in the ABM Treaty. Perhaps the major motivation for the ABM Treaty was not so much crisis stability as "arms race stability"; averting a major build-up both of defensive arms (which, at that stage, wouldn't work at all, any way) and offensive arms (even greater than that which did ensue). That may also be true for the opposition to Star Wars. But I am arguing that there is a real problem of crisis stability: especially in the light of the possibility of limited nuclear wars arising out of US interventions (conceivably occasioned, by the way, by SU interventions: not as often or as critically as Reagan infers and claims, but to some significant extent).

The effect of abandoning damage-limiting, preemptive capabilities—both in existing systems and in programmed systems—would be to reduce or eliminate the coupling between a tactical nuclear exchange in the Third World, a limited nuclear war, and US or Soviet escalation. This would have the effect of making Soviet second-use retaliation to US first use more likely, thus making making US first use threats less credible and execution of such threats more risky. But such execution is risky enough already to be rejected (and on moral grounds as well).

Again, without other changes in capabilities, some US interventions would thereby appear more risky, less desirable. But the premise of this policy shift would be a rejection of US FU threats anyway, and a reduction of US interventions. And one reason for this rejection would be the arms race effects it would permit, i.e., the abandonment of investment in damage-limiting first-strike capability.

New subject:

FU

The first use of nuclear weapons, of course, is far behind us. Also the second, both sixty-seven years ago. But the next use will not be the third, as some suppose. That, according to Harry Truman, author of the first two, took place just a year later. It involved Iran. The fourth and fifth uses, still under Truman, [Berlin; Korea] occurred in the next four years, still under Truman, followed by perhaps thirty others up till the present.

In each of these cases since the uses against Japan (and including those as well) our presidents have used our nuclear weapons in the precise way that a gun is used when it is pointed at someone's head in a confrontation. It is being used whether or not the trigger is pulled. Indeed, to get one's way without having to pull the trigger is generally the best way to get the use out of a gun, the best reason for owning it.

Summary: thirty (?) uses.

All bluffs?

Of course, Truman did pull the trigger on Japan, but the conscious purpose of that was to support a threat. His advisors saw no military advantage to destroying either of the first two target-cities (they were chosen in part because they had been preserved from earlier targeting—chosen for the purpose of demonstrating the Bomb's effects on a previously undamaged city precisely because there was no urgent military reason to hit them otherwise. That was not what Truman first announced to the American public—he lied—but the Japanese, and the Soviets, understood it. The sole objective was coercive; the attacks were to demonstrate to the Japanese (and, for the longer run, the Soviets) both the effects to be expected from atomic attacks, and the president's readiness to launch *more* of them.

Few if any of the president's advisors expected that one or two bombs would be enough to bring about unconditional surrender (by themselves, apart from the possible effects of Soviet entry into the war, or change in surrender terms by the U.S.). Thus they were preparing for many more: a third within days, followed, as the bombs went into regular production, by another every few weeks. McCloy estimated that—ignoring other possible factors--about ten might be needed, which would take till the end of the year. The Japanese civilian deaths from these would not have been the 300,000 alone from Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I have never seen an estimate. But the bombs were being produced, and—absent the Japanese surrender in August—there is no reason to believe they would not have been dropped.

Whether the first two uses had any effect on the shortening of the war at all—compared to or in addition to the effects of the Soviet entry on August 8, and the indications by the U.S. high command that the Emperor would be allowed to remain—is still a matter of

expert controversy. But if they did have an effect (as the great majority of the public was led to believe, by official accounts which were highly manipulative), it was surely as threats, demonstrative threats of more to come, or as Truman put it, "A rain of destruction such as the world has never seen." The destruction wrought by the two bombs themselves was not new to the Japanese; more civilians had been killed in one night, March 9-10 1945, in the firebombing of Tokyo five months earlier than died initially in either Hiroshima or Nagasaki or perhaps even the two together.

(Still the lying description had a mixed impact on the future, not all bad... It established the supposed principle that not much less than the alternative prospect of a million U.S. deaths had justified or could justify the use of a nuclear weapons, the deaths of so many civilian victims. That was not the perspective of Truman and Byrnes, privately, but they didn't contradict this impression but rather fostered it. It obviously was not an available rationale for carrying out a threat to bomb Russia or Iran over Azerbaijan, but that didn't mean that Truman's threat could not have carried any weight with the Soviets. (Whether it actually did or not—or whether the threat was actually passed on, as Truman claimed—is not documented. That does not mean it did not occur. And in particular, it does not mean that Truman did not so remember it, as he claimed, as a success, and an inducement to use a nuclear threat again soon after, over Berlin. But the public misapprehension as to the conditions in the minds of their leaders for legitimate nuclear attacks was from that day to more recent times, an inhibiting factor against presidents' making their threat-uses public and, no doubt, against their readiness to carry them out. That may have changed. At least, presidential behavior—and for that matter, the willingness of presidential candidates and leaders in Congress to talk openly about the possible use of nuclear weapons in preventive attacks—has changed strikingly in the last six years; and that change may outlast the present administration.

Thus, we have used nuclear weapons repeatedly in the Middle East and elsewhere over the last sixty years, and we are using them now, again in a crisis over Iran. That recurrence in the Middle East is no coincidence. Iran, along with Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, represents the most valuable real estate on the face of the earth, sitting, like those others, on top of a sea of oil. There is no greater material, profitable and strategic prize on earth than the control of that oil, the largest and most accessible reserves on the planet.

And Iran itself is now governed by a regime markedly independent of the United States, even unfriendly to it. That was not true for most of the sixty years, but then it was a neighbor of our then-adversary the Soviet Union. There was no way—throughout the Cold War—for the U.S. to prevent the Soviets from dominating Iran and its oil by armed force, if they chose to, other than by threatening or if necessary attacking with nuclear weapons. That was why, Harry Truman explained, he brought the region to the brink of nuclear war in 1946, a year after Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

After (NC): ME oil must not be controlled by... [Attack on Iran → regime friendly to US. Crisis? yes, but...]

HRC...